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MATURE AGGREGATION AND ANGST:
REFRAMING COMPLEX LITIGATION BY
ECHOING FRANCIS MCGOVERN’S
EARLY INSIGHTS INTO REMEDIAL
INNOVATION
JUDITH RESNIK*
I
FIGHTING OVER FISHING
My introduction to Francis McGovern came in the fall of 1985, when the Yale
Law School hosted a “National Conference on Litigation Management.”1 There,
federal district judge Richard Enslen, who sat in the Western District of
Michigan, talked about his experiences dealing with a volatile lawsuit involving
fishing rights in the Great Lakes. An 1836 treaty entered into between the United
States and the Ottawa and Chippewa peoples reserved fishing rights (of some
kind) to the tribes and was supposed to keep the State of Michigan at bay.2 In the
1970s, the United States, which was acting in its fiduciary role on behalf of Indian
tribes, and Michigan disagreed about the respective roles of federal regulation
and state authority. That dispute resulted in a lawsuit, United States v. Michigan,
which produced a series of decisions, including recognition of tribal rights.3
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* Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. All rights reserved. May 2021. Many thanks to Lynn
Baker for her thoughtful suggestions, to the other editors of this volume, to William Rastetter for
information on the Michigan Fishing litigation, to Adela Lilollari and Urja Mittal for insightful assistance
in research (current and past), to Bonnie Posick for expert editorial assistance and poignantly, to Francis
McGovern, from whom I learned a great deal. This essay builds on my discussions of related issues, as
cited. Like many who write about these issues, I am also episodically a participant in cases, either in a
role created by a court or as a lawyer for a party.
1. See Symposium, Litigation Management, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 305 (1986). Sponsors included the
Yale Civil Liability Program chaired by George Priest, an entity called the Center for Public Resources,
and the ABA Section on Litigation. Id. The Center for Public Resources is not, to my knowledge,
ongoing; it was an organization whose funders included insurance companies and was guided at the time
by Judyth Pendell.
2. Treaty of Washington art. 3, March 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491 (1836). The text stated that the tribes
retained the fishing grounds in front of such reservations assigned to them.
3. United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (D. Mich. 1979), remanded, 623 F.2d 448 (6th Cir.
1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981).
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By 1981, the Department of the Interior had let lapse its regulations on fishing
in the Great Lakes, and conflicts intensified.4 For some tribes, fishing was part of
their identity and unrestricted access to the Great Lakes was both their legal right
and essential to their livelihood. Economic concerns also animated non-tribal
members in Michigan’s commercial fishing industry. For others, fishing was a
sport about which they were passionate. In 1984, three tribes—the Bay Mills
Indian Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians—returned to federal court
to enforce what they understood to be their legally-recognized right to take fish
in an amount necessary to “maintain reasonable tribal living standards.”5 In
response, Michigan argued that equitable allocations required considering other
fishers’ economic needs. Sports fishers argued they had distinct interests, a claim
that affected Michigan as well in that it garnered revenues and reputational
benefits from being a destination for tourists.
Judge Enslen told the group assembled in 1985 in New Haven that he had
been involved in many cases with challenging and hotly-disputed issues. Yet,
Judge Enslen said, the fishing rights case was the one in which he feared that
litigants would resort to violence against each other. Those concerns were
notable, given that little in Judge Enslen’s background suggested that he could
be easily daunted. Two decades earlier, in the 1960s, Enslen had gone to
Mississippi to volunteer in voter registration in the Freedom Summer of 1964. He
was there when James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Mickey Schwerner were
murdered.6 Enslen later served in the Peace Corps and headed one of its offices.
When practicing law, Enslen served as lead counsel for the NAACP in a 1971
desegregation lawsuit against the Board of Kalamazoo Public Schools.7 After his
appointment in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter, Enslen presided on several highprofile cases, including a class action challenging conditions at prisons run by the

4. As McGovern explained in discussing the case, the interactions about treaty rights were
complex. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 440, 456–57, nn.91–92 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation].
5. Id. at 457.
6. See Richard Enslen Life Story/Obituary, BETZLER LIFE STORY FUNERAL HOMEs, https://
betzlerlifestory.com/obituaries/richard-enslen.105829 [https://perma.cc/PJ6J-B9VB]; MICH. DIST.
JUDGES ASS’N, CELEBRATING FIFTY YEARS 33 (2018), https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/trialcourts/
Documents/mdja_anniversary_booklet_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYB-WNF6]; Julie Mack, Federal
Judge Richard Enslen Remembered for Impact on Title IX, Desegregation, and Prison Rights,
KALAMAZOO GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/2015/02/federal_
judge_richard_enslen_r.html [https://perma.cc/HJS6-DNNE]; Freedom Summer Volunteers, DIGIT.
STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMM. (SNCC) GATEWAY, https://snccdigital.org/freedomsummer-volunteers/ [https://perma.cc/X6UT-N5RS]; see also Murder in Mississippi, P.B.S., https://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedomsummer-murder/ [https://perma.cc/95EU-LC4X].
7. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Ed., 346 F. Supp. 766 (D. Mich.), aff’d sub nom. Oliver v. Sch. Dist.
of City of Kalamazoo, 448 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971); Richard Enslen Life Story/Obituary, supra note 6;
MICH. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, supra note 6, at 33; Mack, supra note 6. An abbreviated biographical sketch
may be found at Richard Alan Enslen, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/enslen-richardalan [https://perma.cc/S2VX-75LU].
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Michigan Department of Corrections.8 Yet, Judge Enslen reported, he was
worried about the Great Lakes fishing litigation as a source of interpersonal
violence.
Enter Francis McGovern, appointed by Judge Enslen as a special master.
Judge Enslen recounted that, within six months of McGovern’s arrival, a
settlement had been forged among the three tribes—the Bay Mills Indian
Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians; Michigan’s Department of Natural
Resources; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; the Michigan United Conservation
Club; the Grand Traverse Area Sport Fishing Association; the Michigan
Steelhead and Salmon Fishermen’s Association, and the Michigan Charter Boat
Association.9 Enslen provided a detailed account of the agreement, which
included provisions for allotting fish, zones for fishing, and parameters for the
gear to use for catching whitefish, lake trout, walleye, perch, salmon, and chub.
Under McGovern’s guidance, that accord was commemorated with a lakeside
ceremony at which participants passed a peace pipe.10
More about McGovern’s work in this lawsuit comes from his 1986 article,
Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation.11 As
McGovern explained, the law governing the dispute was mushy (my word): the
concepts of “reasonable living standards,” “subsistence,” “maximizing value,”
and “equal distribution” were not readily defined.12 Moreover, the parties needed
to coexist, then and in the future. McGovern also described the intense political
investment of the parties, and that the tribes and the state saw the implications
for their sovereignty, autonomy, and identity. Framing the interactions, as
McGovern recounted, were the tribes’ long experiences of exploitation-throughnegotiation (again, my term) which made them leery of entering into discussions
with their opponents.13
McGovern’s “prescription” for resolution was to use the short time-frame
(four months) before a scheduled trial to develop information and a method (“a
scorable game”) for each party to assess its own interests and priorities as well as
to sharpen parties’ focus on negotiating to differentiate concerns so as to
maximize what was most valued.14 Two innovations can be gleaned from his
8. The prison litigation began in 1974, and Judge Enslen’s major decision concluding that prison
conditions were unconstitutional on a variety of dimensions was Knop v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467, 469
(D. Mich. 1987), affirmed in part and reversed in part in a consolidated decision by Knop v. Johnson, 977
F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992).
9. Consent Order, United States v. Michigan, No. M26–73 CA (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 1985)
[hereinafter 1985 Michigan Consent Order]; see United States v. Michigan, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3079
(abridged text) (W.D. Mich. 1985) [hereinafter Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial].
10. The first consent decree ended in 2000. See 1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶ 53
11. McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 456–68. That symposium resulted in
a volume of published essays. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
12. McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 459.
13. Id. at 460.
14. Id. at 460–63.
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account: he changed the party configuration by insisting on the inclusion of more
disputants (potentially expanding the conflict), and he helped steer the group into
arriving at a settlement that had appeal because it was time-limited. Unlike the
1836 Treaty, the settlement was initially for fifteen years, with a provision for the
court’s jurisdiction to continue “thereafter.”15
McGovern’s methods aimed to delineate the distinctive and the overlapping
interests of an array of participants. As Judge Enslen detailed in a 1985 opinion,
the sport fishing groups and others had moved to intervene. After McGovern
became involved, the court deemed the group “litigating amici.”16 Under that
umbrella came the Michigan United Conservation Clubs, the Grand Travers
Area Sport Fishing Association, the Michigan Steelhead and Salmon
Association, the Michigan Charter Boat Association, and other individual
licensed commercial fishers,17 all of whom McGovern drew into discussions.
As to the formal parties, McGovern helped to distinguish the varied views of
the Bay Mills Indian Community, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians, and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa-Chippewa Indians, which he
learned had different relationships to fishing in the Great Lakes. As he put it, one
tribe sought to preserve its culture; another was focused on the economic benefit;
and the third, more open to compromise, sought to find accommodations.18
McGovern also disaggregated “the State of Michigan,” which itself was not
univocal but included a range of concerns. State officials had to attend to an array
of interests that included tourism and sports fishing, respect for all of its citizens,
some of whom were members of Indian tribes and others who were not, and the
economic needs of its commercial fishing industry. McGovern understood that
the state leadership was not necessarily cohesive. Therefore, he met separately
with the Governor, the Attorney General, and the head of the state’s Department
of Natural Resources.19 The details in his article are vintage McGovern, as he
enlarged the circle of conflict by welcoming the many people affected (albeit not
all as full litigating parties with veto power) to be present in some of the
negotiations.
McGovern identified what he termed the “five major variables: species of
fish, quantity of fish, fishing gear, geography, and time.”20 He convinced the
participants to pool expert data from biologists and to listen to litigants involved
in fishing conflicts in other states so as to learn about the different methods of
allocating rights and the various responses of other judges. Demonstrating that
he was ahead of the curve, McGovern innovated by using computer models to

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶ 53.
McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 463 n.108.
Id.
Id. at 462–63.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463.
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develop game theory-based models of outcomes.21 McGovern thus shaped
parameters for negotiation and promoted enough of a willingness to compromise
that an agreement was made, provisional on approval by each party.22 A
disagreement about the authority of the designated representative of the Bay
Mills Tribe brought the lawsuit back to Judge Enslen, who held a trial on the Bay
Mills’ proposed 50-50 allocation and (unsurprisingly) concluded that, instead, the
negotiated plan was the right result on the merits.23
By recording the strife that had preceded the settlement, Judge Enslen’s May
31, 1985 decision documented McGovern’s achievements. After the 1979 district
court ruling recognizing tribal fishing rights, there had been years of “hard
feelings, social discord, occasional violence, stipulated court-ordered closures of
large portions of the three affected Great Lakes, political posturing, protraction
of the instant litigation, some outward manifestations of racism, and concern
about the future of Michigan’s greatest resources, her people and her natural
bounty.”24 In contrast, the settlement set up zones for fishing, allocation rules, a
series of governing structures (a Joint Enforcement Committee, a Technical
Fishery Review Committee, an Information and Education Committee, and an
Executive Council), a mechanism for data collection, and a way to gather funds
for implementation from both the state and federal governments.25
What Judge Enslen’s opinion also detailed were the complexities and the
long-term uncertainties about fishing stock, their habitat, and pollution. Amidst
those variables and unknowns, the 15-year agreement provided a reasonably
predictable management plan that avoided “racehorse fishing” —getting as much
as possible to meet a fixed allotment—and helped to make sustainable the
resource, at least for a time.26 Zooming out to think about the result in terms of
contemporary debates about the remedial powers of the federal courts, the
fishing agreement is one of many examples of results not readily boxed in the
legal categories of law and equity. Even as the relief sounded in equity and fishing
allocations were not directly monetized, streams of income were centrally
affected.
In short, McGovern helped to bring about an outcome because he changed
the stakes through excavating the lines of conflict, configuring the disputed
issues, adding participants, pressing the parties to distinguish their own interests
and decide on priorities, and altering the longevity of the deal. Instead of seeking
what today is often called “global peace,” McGovern aimed for a consent decree

21. Id. at 462. More recent examples of innovative use of technology come from Elizabeth J.
Cabreser and Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017).
22. McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 4, at 464–65.
23. Id. at 465–66; see also Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9.
24. Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9.
25. 1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 31–44.
26. Bay Mills 1985 Allocation Trial, supra note 9, at 3082–87.
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that was renewable but initially limited to fifteen years.27 By making a multi-party
case more multi-party and by asking participants not to bind themselves and their
successors to a world they could not foresee, McGovern found enough common
ground that the parties agreed to learn how they could manage under a
settlement that could sunset within two decades. (My account is not rosy-eyed; as
discussed below, conflicts emerged within that time and, thereafter, a revised
agreement, with many modifications and an appendix of 28 pages of graphics,
was put into place until 2020 and then extended for some months thereafter.28)
A few years after the Michigan fishing litigation settlement, McGovern wrote
an article that he entitled Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation.29 That 1989
analysis coined the phrase “mature tort” to capture McGovern’s argument that
aggregation ought only to occur after many individual cases had been filed and
litigated. McGovern worried that if “too early”—a metric much debated
thereafter—aggregation could abort the unearthing of information requisite to a
fair outcome and an understanding of the legal issues raised. As the title of this
essay reflects, I have applied his term to him. Early on, McGovern was the
“mature” person who focused on how to generate remedies that would be
workable, even if not enduring forever. He aimed to help disputants in the here
and now.
II
TEMPORIZING IN A VARIEGATED AND VULNERABLE LITIGATION
LANDSCAPE
Thirty years after McGovern’s analysis about the mature mass tort,
aggregation itself has gained a maturity that merits reconsidering its forms and
practices. Above, I revisited some of the lessons from McGovern’s work in the
1980s. I did so both as a tribute to him and to learn more from what he did when,
in the fishing litigation, he reconfigured the party structure and moved the
disputants—and the court—away from a quest for global peace.
Here, I build on the fishing conflict and McGovern’s other work to bring to
the fore examples of coordination that alter the composition of disputants,
including by crossing the formal jurisdictional boundaries with this federation. I
do so to provide more reasons why aspiring for a “partial peace”—as McGovern
27. 1985 Michigan Consent Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 53–55; Fishing Rights Update Due Today,
INDIANZ (July 5, 2000), https://www.indianz.com/News/show.asp?ID=law/752000-1 [https://perma.cc/
M7FH-B7SK].
28. See Consent Decree, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-CV-000260 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2000),
ECF No. 1458, Page ID 3216; Fishing Rights Update Due Today, supra note 27; Jim Malewitz, All Eyes
on Grand Traverse Bay as Deadline Looms for Tribal Fishing Decree, BRIDGE MICH. (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-environment-watch/all-eyes-grand-traverse-bay-deadline-looms-tri
bal-fishing-decree [https://perma.cc/BMJ3-RPZC]. The consent decree entered on August 8, 2000 was to
expire on August 8, 2020. However, because of ongoing negotiations and Covid-19, the Honorable Paul
L. Maloney extended the consent decree to December 31, 2020 and then to June 30, 2021. See Order
Extending the Expiration of the 2000 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73CV-000260 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No. 1903.
29. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989).
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taught the parties to do in Michigan—is preferable to thinking that one is
wrapping a problem up for good. What is needed, whether the remedies sought
are equitable, legal, or an amalgam thereof, are more ceremonies of celebration
marking that lawyers and judges have helped people immediately and
acknowledging that the results are partial, with the potential for related conflicts
to emerge or continue. As I argue below, aggregate resolutions can, in various
situations, be temporizing in that a delineated resolution can provide a timeframe in which (one hopes) disputants can learn to accommodate, live within its
parameters as information develops and stakes can change, and if needed, revisit
aspects of the agreement thereafter.
To recognize that these resolutions are temporizing, aggregate settlements
need to articulate ongoing roles for courts, lawyers, and affiliated actors during
the post-settlement life of complex lawsuits. Even as such a process entails time
and resources, it can be generative for the parties as they work out whatever
interactions remain in the wake of their dispute. Moreover, building out this third
phase is generative for courts and the body politic. When judges shoulder the
obligations of overseeing the implementation of remedies and engage on the
record with the disputants, third parties have opportunities to understand what
has transpired and to see the normative utility and procedural integrity entailed
in trying to make material the outcomes of judicially-sanctioned resolutions.
Before sketching a few facets of how to do so, I need to outline how litigation
has changed in the decades since the 1980s. In addition to knowing a lot more
about how aggregate litigation functions, we also know that the work of the
federal courts has shifted. The animating assumptions that brought a group to
New Haven in 1985 to talk about “litigation management” were that litigation
was booming, that the federal courts had too many cases, that more were coming
down the pike, and that changes were needed to handle that volume. Indeed, that
conference was funded in part by entities often associated with, or named as,
defendants. The problems from the vantage point of some speakers were the
overuse of courts and the need to curb their authority. For McGovern, litigation
had to be managed to help craft solutions; for others, management was aimed at
shifting away from adjudication and, in some instances, limiting opportunities to
file claims.
Since then, the political and legal efforts to circumscribe the use of courts
have succeeded in reshaping the federal courts’ docket. Even before the Trump
Administration had its impact on the federal bench, the number of federal filings
had flattened.30 The trend has continued. By 2020—and holding aside the more
than 200,000 cases wrapped into a new, massive multidistrict litigation (MDL)
involving allegedly faulty earplugs for members of the armed services—filings fell
by about ten percent.31 Moreover, the Court has imposed barriers to access
30. Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1900 (2017).
31. In 2020, 470,581 civil cases were filed, of which 202,814 were part of in re 3M Combat Arms
Earplug Product Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2885 (N.D. Fla). See JOHN G. ROBERTS, SUP. CT. OF THE
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through narrow constructions of standing.32 The assault on class actions is well
underway.33 Caps on damages have been put in place in many states. The
Supreme Court has cut off the use of implied statutory causes of action, and two
members of the Court have argued to end constitutional implied causes of
action.34 In addition, millions of consumers and employees had been closed out
of courts and left to proceed, if at all, single-file into closed arbitrations run by
providers selected by the entities whose actions they contest.35 The economics of
litigation pose yet other barriers, as during these decades, the fees charged by
some lawyers, the costs of retaining experts, and the assessments imposed by
courts have all increased.
Reflecting these reconfigurations, many of the litigants who do enter the
federal courts have limited resources. One window comes from tracking filings
by people who are self-represented. Of some 260,000 civil cases filed annually,
about twenty-five percent are brought by people without lawyers, and more than

U.S., 2020 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.sup
remecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2020year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LS5-99HC] (“New filings
in district courts were nominally greater, but excluding filings connected to a single multidistrict litigation,
they were also lower than the prior year.”); see also id. at 6 (“Civil case filings in the U.S. district courts
increased 58 percent, from 297,877 to 470,581, mostly attributable to an earplug products liability
multidistrict litigation (MDL) centralized in the Northern District of Florida, which consolidated 202,814
filings. Excluding that MDL, civil cases filings fell ten percent.”).
32. See Thole v U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1619 (2020). An exception—whose implications
are not clear—is the 2021 decision of Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021).
33. See e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Action and the Counterrevolution Against
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017). As I write, the Court is considering yet further
cutbacks, as it agreed to hear Ramirez v. TransUnion, LLC, a consumer class action that had alleged that
TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to have
“reasonable procedures” to ensure accurate information on consumers and of failing to provide adequate
information to consumers. See Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted
in part sub nom. TransUnion, LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, 2020 WL 7366280 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (mem).
The claim entailed incorrectly placed “terrorist alerts” on the front page of the consumers’ credit reports
that identified individuals whose names matched “specially designated nationals,” potentially engaged in
illegal behavior. Id. at 1016–17. TransUnion had relied on a “name-only matching protocol,” which the
jury concluded did not meet the statutory requirements. Id. at 1019. The jury awarded $60 million in
statutory and punitive damages. Id. at 1017. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, over a dissent concerned that
the trial had proceeded without sufficient evidence of the range of people who had been wrongly labeled
by the “name-only” matching system. See id.
As framed by the defendant company, the question to be addressed is “Whether Article III or Rule
23 permits a damages class action where the vast majority of the class suffered no actual injury, let alone
an injury anything like what the class representative suffered.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5,
TransUnion, LLC, No. 20-297.The goal of the petitioners appears to be to return to the ruling in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), which did not rule out standing for the plaintiff; that decision has
become vulnerable in light of the change in the Court’s membership. Of course, at issue is not only how
to define “injury” but also the authority of Congress to create remedies and the role played by class
actions in making lawyers available by representing aggregates.
34. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J).
35. Judith Resnik, Stephanie Garlock & Annie J. Wang, Collective Preclusion and Inaccessible
Arbitration: Data, Non-disclosure, and Public Knowledge, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 611 (2020); see
also Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open
Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the
Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
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half the cases before the federal appellate courts are brought by self-represented
parties.36 In contrast, between thirty and forty percent of pending civil cases are
part of multidistrict litigation,37 a kind of lawsuit tracked by the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). Some MDLs include class actions, about which
we have more limited data, as the AO does not routinely gather information on
the number of class actions filed. The bipolar distribution—many lawyerlesslitigants and the volume in MDLs—makes plain the centrality of aggregation and
federal judges’ dependency on it. As Ben Kaplan—central to revising the federal
class action rule in 1966—explained, aggregate litigation is a key mechanism for
subsidizing litigants who would otherwise have no effective way to come to
court.38
Below, I pull a few examples from the 1980s and 1990s of innovations—often
involving McGovern. Yet, I am keenly aware that in 2021, the question is whether
opportunities to use large-scale litigation to enable remedies for a variety of
individuals will exist. My excavation of these past efforts and my commentary on
the need to reframe practices and expectations in aggregate cases is based on the
hopes for a future in which such configurations are welcomed, even as today, a
generative, remedial role for the federal bench remains uncertain.

36. See Judicial Business, tbl. B-19, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Pro Se Cases Filed, By Source—in the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s Judicial Reports (1996-2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.
gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=B-19&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%
5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D= [https://perma.cc/RHP7-QA8R]; Judicial Business, tbl. C-13, U.S. District
Courts—Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District—in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s
Judicial Reports (2004-2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=B19&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D= [https://per
ma.cc/JP3V-HFZZ]. I provide more discussion of changes in the federal courts’ docket in my article
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1831, 1913–14 (2016).
37. See Lynn A. Baker & Stephen J. Herman, Layers of Lawyers: Parsing the Complexities of
Claimant Representation in Mass Tort MDLs, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469, 470–71 (2020). Depending
on who is counting, the numbers are variously reported and ranged from about 30 to 50 percent in 2019.
Id. at 470 n.1. As of 2020, and including in re 3M Combat Arms Earplug Liability Litigation, about sixty
percent of the federal docket was in an MDL. That data was reported by the Chief Justice in his end of
2020 report. See ROBERTS, supra note 31.
38. Benjamin Kaplan, A Preparatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969); see also
Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5 ; Charles
Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733,
744–49 (1997).
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III
JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY, COMPLEX COORDINATION, DEESSENTIALIZING STATE, TRIBAL, AND FEDERAL INTERESTS, AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
As I have sketched in other essays,39 the jurisdictional redundancy within the
United States’ form of federalism is a resource that interacts with McGovern’s
insights about the need to welcome diverse participants and to try to lower the
stakes through narrowing the time horizon of remedies. Large-scale litigation
often spills across the formal borders of states, Indian tribes, and the federal
system. Hence, today’s aggregates could seek to use extant networks that are
border-crossing and that reflect cross-border-connections. For a period of time
in the 1980s and 1990s, judges in state and federal courts aimed (often guided by
Francis McGovern) to coordinate their work on parallel mass tort actions. For
example, a consortium of state court judges called themselves the Mass Tort
Litigating Committee (MTLC).40 An explanation comes from the Honorable
Helen E. Freedman of New York State’s Supreme (trial-level) Court, describing
what she termed Coordination of Litigation Within New York and Between
Federal and State Courts.41 She credited Francis McGovern for finding a way to
sustain that effort:
After six prior applications had been rejected to coordinate the asbestos litigation for
cases filed in federal courts, a number of state judges, correctly anticipating that most
new asbestos cases would then be brought in state courts, established a state Mass Tort
Litigation Committee (MTLC) under the aegis of the Conference of Chief Justices to
discuss techniques for managing asbestos cases. Using the good offices of Professor
Francis E. McGovern, MTLC obtained funding that would last for about five years from
the State Justice Institute. The National Center for State Courts administered the State
Justice Institute grant and handled logistical arrangements enabling the judges to meet
with each other periodically in different cities. Although it was originally an asbestos
litigation committee, the Committee’s functions expanded to include other mass torts.42

While not often invoked in the law review literature, another interjurisdictional initiative was the drafting of The Manual for Cooperation Between
State and Federal Courts, sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, the National
Center for State Courts, and the State Justice Institute. The monograph set out

39. See Judith Resnik, Partial “Global Peace”: Federalism and the Long Tail of Remedies in Opioid
Litigation, 70 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using
Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and
Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Reorienting the Process
Due]. Recognizing the importance of scaling back expectations is not to ignore the complexity of doing
so when both money and equitable relief are sought. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of
Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1943 (2017).
40. See Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1851, 1863–64 (1997); see also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for
Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1879, 1894 (2000).
41. Helen E. Freedman & Joseph J. Maltese, Inter-state Coordination, in ROBERT L. HAIG,
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 18:25 (5th ed. 2020).
42. Id.
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methods of coordination that the authors thought was the way of the future.43
They explained that, as “these parallel efforts have been increasingly formalized
in the respective judicial systems, state and federal courts are now advancing to
the next logical stage of state–federal coordination of multijurisdictional
litigation: the development of formal intersystem coordination.”44 But rather
than moving in that direction, litigation’s opponents have succeeded in damping
down filings in state and federal courts. For example, Congress enacted the
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, which authorizes defendants in
large-scale state torts to remove cases to the federal courts; proponents of that
legislation assumed that federal judges would be less hospitable to class actions
than many state court judges.45
During the past decades when entry to courts was more viable than it
appears to be now, some federal and state judges worked directly together and,
at times, sat together in the same courtroom, albeit legally in two different
jurisdictions. Illustrative is the Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, in which
the Honorable Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York and Justice
Helen Freedman in New York State’s Supreme Court issued a 1990 co-authored
opinion with two captions—one for each of their jurisdictions; their ruling was
docketed independently in both.46 In another case, two judges sat together to
work on a settlement stemming from the collapse of a hotel skywalk in
Connecticut; Judge Zampano of the U.S. District Court for Connecticut and
Judge Frank Meadow of Connecticut’s Superior Court helped lawyers to shape
an agreement embracing cases in state and federal court.47

43. JAMES G. APPLE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD & G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, FED. JUD. CTR.,
MANUAL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 31 (1997). As they explained:
The Mass Tort Litigation Committee (MTLC), a standing subcommittee of the Conference of
Chief Justices, serves as the state counterpart to the federal JPML. Although it lacks the
authority to command state courts to engage in coordinated pretrial activities, the MTLC
accomplishes some of the same tasks as the JPML by facilitating voluntary cooperation among
state courts. In addition to active involvement in ongoing cases (e.g., coordinating discovery and
trial schedules), the MTLC acts as a communication and information network, developing
performance standards and standardized procedures for managing complex litigation. It also
advises state and federal organizations—e.g., the U.S. Congress and the Conference of Chief
Justices—about the jurisdictional issues implicated by complex litigation.
Id.
44. Id.; see also NAT’L JUD. COLLEGE, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION
(2010); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., FED. JUD. CTR., COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2013) [hereinafter COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION
LITIGATION].
45. Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C § 1369.
46. See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 123 B.R. 7 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y 1990). For discussion, see
William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of
Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (1992); Asbestos Litigation Crisis in
Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin. of H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 53–54 (1992) (statement of Helen Freedman, J., N.Y. App. Div.).
47. Sam Howe Verhovek, Pact Reached in Collapse of Building, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 1988), https://
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/16/nyregion/pact-reached-in-collapse-of-building.html [https://perma.cc/9U
ET-39F7].
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Another example of border-connections comes from the Honorable Sam
Pointer, who was the judge for In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products
Liability Litigation.48 Sitting in the federal court in Alabama, Judge Pointer
interacted on a regular basis with more than two dozen state court judges. They
held a joint Daubert hearing as well as regular conferences.49 Judge Pointer also
pioneered efforts to impose control over the MDL attorneys; he required
contributions to what was termed the “common benefit fund” to fund joint
discovery and to support the structure for proceeding on behalf of the group in
the MDL.50
All of the initiatives—like the Michigan fishing settlement’s governance
structures—take money. France McGovern was able to secure government
resources for MTLC. Yet federal funds for such efforts are sparse. In 2020, the
State Justice Institute’s budget of $6.6 million was far from adequate for the
needs.51 While state courts deal with more than ninety percent of the country’s
litigation, Congress has provided much more funding for administrative and
educational support for the federal court system. In 2020, the budget for the AO
was $94.3 million, and Congress provided an additional $30.4 million for the
Federal Judicial Center. Absent significant new allocations from Congress for
state court initiatives or success by the National Center for State Courts in
attracting grants for such work, contemporary efforts at coordination across
borders will likely be based in the federal courts.52
The idea of more joint judicial work comes from people at the trial level who
see litigants’ needs for responsiveness in courts. But such coordination is complex
and raises serious legal questions that merit more than this brief essay can sketch.
Judges talking with each other about parallel cases may well need rules, including
that parties have access to information exchanged outside their presence among
the judges. Further, issues of hierarchy lurk, as a federal court can have
disproportionate informal authority over cases that are not “in” its jurisdiction.
Thus, I flag only some of the many logistical, legal, economic, and political
hurdles. These problems need to be addressed in an era of mature aggregation,
just as we should explore more of federalism’s options and think about how

48. MDL No. 926 (N.D. Ala.).
49. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995);
COORDINATING MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION, supra note 44, at 10, for a discussion of joint Daubert
hearings in federal and state court; APPLE, HANNAFORD & MUNSTERMAN supra note 43, at 128 for a
sample comprehensive case-management order for consolidated cases.
50. Notice No. 27, Notice of Rights under Breast Implant Litigation, In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants, 887 F. Supp. 1463.
51. Budget data for 2020 comes from CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45702, OVERVIEW OF FY2020
APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES (CJS) 16 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45702.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PCV-ZL5G]. Budget data for 2019 comes from
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45237, OVERVIEW OF FY2019 APPROPRIATIONS FOR COMMERCE, JUSTICE,
SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES (CJS) 17 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45237.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U5Q5-7QUW].
52. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45964, JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS, FY2020 11 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q35-NJK8].
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federal MDLs, bankruptcy, and litigation in state courts (in and outside of state
MDLs) can intersect productively so that judges and lawyers, including state
attorneys general, can collaborate.53
The Great Lakes fishing litigation underscores another facet of federalism,
which is the need to probe the constructs of “state” and “Indian tribe” to identify
distinct interests within each. McGovern learned that neither the tribes nor
Michigan had singular concerns, nor were they fixed. Preferences are not
exogenous nor static, but formed through multifaceted exchanges.54 Moreover,
to conceptualize states, cities, Indian tribes, and other subunits as discrete actors
is to miss that many of their activities are embedded in and related to translocal
and transnational social movements and organizations.
The Michigan fishing litigation involved that state, three Indian tribes, the
federal government, and several private parties. Another example of a
configuration crossing sovereign lines comes from the problems of acid rain
affecting the Great Lakes, subunits of the United States and of Canada;
coordination among those entities illustrates that acid rain, pollution, and wildlife
do not stop at jurisdictional borders.55 Moreover, dozens of cross-border,
translocal organizations play roles in shaping national and local agendas. I have
already mentioned the National Center for State Courts, a private entity
supporting the work of state judiciaries. Parallels include the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Attorneys
General, and many more. These translocal organizations of governmental actors
(TOGAs is my shorthand) gain power because their members hold particular
public positions.56 I have elsewhere detailed the roles played by TOGAs as norm
entrepreneurs and information distributors.57 Looking to enlist TOGAs to
contribute to aggregations would be one way to help bring a range of concerns to
bear on problems that span the country.
Reconfiguring expectations about resolutions is the other lesson to emphasize
here, again drawing on McGovern’s work on the fishing conflicts in Michigan. He
focused on achieving a fifteen-year agreement rather than trying to gain assent
to an agreement governing a longer period. Doing so was plainly pragmatic, as
the parties may well have refused to commit to more. A time frame was (and can

53. See Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLS, Clifford
Symposium DePaul (forthcoming 2021); see also Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, MDL in the
States, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); D. Theodore Rave & Zachary D. Clopton, Texas MDL,
24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367 (2020). Exploration of judicial innovation in MDL can be found in Abbe
Gluck and Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2021).
54. See Judith Resnik, Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability of Rights as
a Norm of Federalism(s), 17 JUS POLITICUM 209 (2017).
55. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Can.-U.S., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301; Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, Can.-U.S., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383.
56. I discuss these organizations and their agendas in Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh,
Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of
Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (2008).
57. Id.
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often be) useful because it built in a way to respond to changing needs. And
indeed, even within those fifteen years, conflicts emerged.
About half way into the fifteen-year term, Michigan returned to court and
argued that the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians had
breached their obligation not to use gill nets; the tribes countered that the state
had breached its obligation to provide alternatives.58 Judge Enslen agreed in part
with both sides; he ordered an end to gill net fishing and that the state help
develop an alternative.59 According to one account, four years thereafter, no
viable alternative had come into being.60 The discord was one of several,
including conflicts over salmon fishing rights.61 Nonetheless, and in part through
what had been put into place in 1985, the parties entered into another agreement
in 2000 that had a twenty-year time span. (As of this writing, the court had
authorized more time for negotiations.62)
The Great Lakes fishing accord (and its discord) underscored that shaping
workable agreements is hard and that quests for global and even partial peace
may miss both immediate needs and the difficulties of foreseeing shifts in those
needs. One way to respond is to rethink the federal procedural rules governing
aggregation. As I argued in an essay commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of
the 1966 Rule 23 class action, the contours of Rule 23 should be reconsidered.
The 1960s drafters could not know what we, who have worked in their wake, have
come to understand. The Rule’s template of a two-step process—certify and
settle—misses that large-scale litigation (whether via class actions, multi-district
litigation, or other modes of aggregation) often entails three steps, with a third
phase after whatever resolutions are forged.63 Even as the Great Lakes fishing
litigation built in reconsideration, issues arose along the way. That case is but one
example of many instances in which facets of an agreement are revisited after a
settlement is entered.
When drafting Rule 23 in the 1960s, rule makers assumed a unity of interest
within a plaintiff class. Worried about the legitimacy of representative actions,
the drafters took solace in their confidence that judges could identify a group in
58. Order No. M 26-73, United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich., Oct. 19, 1992),
discussed in Karen Ferguson, Indian Fishing Rights: Aftermath of the Fox Decision and the Year 2000, 23
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 97, 134–35 (1998).
59. Order No. M 26-73, supra note 58; see also William Rastetter, The Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians Our Opinion, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE, Sept. 28 1997 at E11
(quoting the court’s 1990 transcript ruling). On October 19, 1992 and June 26, 1992, the Court prohibited
gill net fishing. The June 26, 1992 ruling also ordered that the Grand Traverse Band, in lieu of gill net
fishing, shall “participate with the State of Michigan in a project to determine the feasibility of small-boat
impoundment fishing.” Order, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-cv-00026-PLM (W.D. Mich. Jun 26,
1992), ECF No. 1092; see also Order, United States v. Michigan, No. 2:73-cv-00026-PLM (W.D. Michigan,
Oct. 19, 1992), ECF No. 1109. A series of reports (from the years 1992, 1993, and 1995) detailed these
experiments.
60. Ferguson, supra note 58, at 136–37.
61. Id. at 137–42.
62. Details of the conflicts after the settlement in the mid-1980s and of the renegotiation underway,
as of this writing, are in note 28, supra.
63. Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra note 39, at 1018.
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which a “homogeneity of interests” existed.64 Their examples included customers
overcharged by a utility and children in segregated schools. Assuming the ability
of federal courts to perceive when interests were sufficiently aligned to permit
group-based litigation, the drafters outlined how judges ought to assess requests
for certification at the outset and then again when a case ended, so as to reaffirm
the propriety of class treatment.
That two-step process recognized in part that the interests of groups dealt
with in the aggregate were not necessarily fixed over the lifespan of a litigation
and that lawyers for the class needed oversight. The 1966 Rule 23 therefore
required judges to interrogate the homogeneity of interests at the time of
certification and then to return to that question at settlement. Amendments in
2003 expanded the role of courts at certification and at settlement by charging
judges with appointing counsel for the class, by outlining rules for the award of
attorneys’ fees, and by enlarging the possibilities for interlocutory appeals.65
Amendments in 2018 again wrote more detail into the contours of oversight at
settlement.66 Yet thereafter, Rule 23 (originally in 1966 and in subsequent
amendments) falls silent; it puts no obligations on judges—or lawyers—to
continue working to oversee the remedies provided through settlements, to deal
with disputes that may arise, or to require public accountings for what
transpires.67
Given that litigants and that courts depend on aggregation, revisions of Rule
23 are needed to reconfigure the expectations of courts and parties about what
“resolution” means. A few judges have exercised authority that ought to be
spelled out in rules—that jurisdiction must continue to ensure remedial efficacy
and to take into account the possibility of some forms of reconsideration.68 Doing
so is not exotic, but a part of the federal common and statutory law of preclusion
in a variety of areas. Indeed, the potential to revisit outcomes of class action
litigation was in discussion in the 1960s, when the drafters of Rule 23 debated

64. CONG. INFO. SERVS., MODIFICATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS FOR CLASS ACTIONS, APPENDED
TO TENTATIVE PROPOSAL TO MODIFY PROVISIONS GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS, RULE 23, at EE-11
n.5 (1962). This preliminary memorandum was referenced in a related memo, “Class Actions—Some
Further Thoughts,” which has a handwritten note “August 1962,” at its top; the Further Thoughts memo
noted that the Modifications memo had been provided in advance of the May 28-29, 1962 meeting of the
Advisory Committee of Civil Rules, drafting Rule 23. See Class Actions—Some Further Thoughts 1
(Aug. 1962), from the papers of Professor Kaplan archived in the Historical and Special Collections of
the Harvard Law Library, at Box 75, folder 5 in the Benjamin Kaplan Papers, 1939–2010, at the Historical
and Special Collections of the Harvard Law Library.
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g), 23(h), 23(f), reprinted in 215 F.R.D. 158 (2003).
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), as amended in 2018 to provide a list of factors to consider for
evaluating settlements and including “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to
the class, including the method of processing class-member claims.”
67. Some districts do make reference to these issues in their local rules. See, e.g., Procedural
Guidance for Class Action Settlements, U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OF CAL. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.ca
nd.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidance-for-class-action-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/4X2A-YS5J].
68. Putting these provisions into rules is especially important in light of a prevailing narrow
interpretation of the equitable authority of judges under the rules. See, e.g., United States v. Carlisle, 517
U.S. 416 (1996); see also In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2020).
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whether their rule should require or suggest that potential class members receive
notice. The drafters puzzled about whether a class action rule could bind one side
but not the other. Focused on misbehavior by defendants such as utility
companies, the drafters considered whether only a defendant in a class action
would be precluded from subsequently contesting the first ruling, while plaintiff
class members might not be barred from bringing claims again.69
Currently, several kinds of cases leave open the possibility for change.
Decisions on child custody and on support routinely provide for reconsideration
as children age and if family circumstances alter. On the criminal side, the writ of
habeas corpus recognizes the potential (rare under current doctrine and statutes)
that judges need to revisit convictions and sentences. Civil rights injunctions are
another example, as the U.S. Supreme Court has crafted a distinctive approach
licensing modification of some kinds of injunctions in light of events subsequent
to their entry.70 In the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Congress built in
obligations to end or reconsider resolutions in lawsuits involving unconstitutional
prison conditions.71 The long litigation related to the harms of Agent Orange
provides another illustration, albeit one in which efforts to alter the agreement
were rebuffed despite the emergence of new information about the harms of that
poison.72 These examples reflect that the common law doctrine of preclusion has
been and can be tempered in light of the needs of litigants in context-specific
settings to enable judges to return to decisions or settlements.73
Large-scale litigation has a long tail. We have learned from more than six
decades of complex litigation like the Michigan fishing dispute and in a range of
other aggregate proceedings that the conflicts among the parties and within
classes or subgroups do not always stop when a settlement is achieved.
Resolutions reflect that reality, as decisions and agreements often build in special
masters and compliance monitors; in cases involving economic relief, a parallel
set of auxiliary personnel oversee implementation. Disagreement about terms
often arise, and plaintiffs and defendants may return to court to seek
enforcement. Thus, for those focused on civil rights and prisoner class actions,
this third phase of litigation, complete with public scrutiny of the decisions made,
is familiar. Yet the incentives to return to court in cases resulting in large

69. I provide more analysis of that discussion in Judith Resnik, “Vital State” Interests, “Vital” State
Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and
MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1790–96 (2017).
70. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); Horne v. Flores, 577 U.S. 433
(2009).
71. Prison Litigation Reform Act § 801, 42 U.S.C § 1997e (2012).
72. See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); Hartman v. Diamond
Shamrock Chemicals Co., 510 U.S. 1140 (1994); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996
F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir. 1993); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 (D.N.Y. 1991).
73. Preclusion also requires specific inquiries into what was and what was not litigated. See Lucky
Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 140 S. Ct. 1589 (2020)

13_RESNIK (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2021]

6/21/2021 4:12 PM

MATURE AGGREGATION AND ANGST

247

monetary settlements are different. Defendants seeking economic closure have
few incentives to raise questions about the distribution of remedies.74
Nonetheless, some mass tort or economic injury cases have included ongoing
remedies with post-settlement oversight in place. For a period of time, heart valve
product defect lawsuits included medical monitoring remedies.75 The Agent
Orange settlement provided for social services for veterans.76 More recently,
Judge Vince Chhabria, sitting in the Northern District of California, has in a few
cases structured an ongoing relationship of the litigants to the court. In a class
action settlement brought by people working with Lyft and seeking monetary
relief, Judge Chhabria conditioned his approval on a series of post-settlement
accountings.77 In one such order, plaintiffs’ counsel was instructed to provide the
judge with a “notice of completion of duties,” to be filed after the final
distribution of payments, and to include the total amount distributed, the number
of class members to whom payments were sent, the amounts paid, the checks
cashed, and discussion of the issues that had arisen.78 In another, dealing with a
class of potentially more than three million people, challenging the charges
imposed for some fifteen years by Wells Fargo, Judge Chhabria issued what was
styled an “order granting final approval, service awards, and attorneys’ fees”
approving the establishment of a $142 million fund.79 That order directed that,
“[w]ithout affecting the finality of this Judgment, the Court reserves jurisdiction
over the Class Representatives, the Settlement Class, and Defendants as to all
matters concerning the administration, consummation, and enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement.”80 Yet another example comes from pending litigation
about the methodology used by CIGNA, found to have harmed employee
pension plans, in its reformation of those plans; the plaintiff-class has called for a
post-judgment accounting and court oversight.81

74. For a discussion of defendants’ absence, see Lynn A. Baker, Mass Tort Remedies and the Puzzle
of the Disappearing Defendant, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (2020).
75. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits,
88 VA. L. REV. 1975 (2002); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 815 (2002).
76. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 851 (D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d sub nom. In
re Agent Orange Prod Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
77. See Order Requiring Notice of Completion of Duties, Cotter v. Lyft, 176 F.Supp.3d 930 (N.D.
Cal. April 6, 2018).
78. Id.
79. Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 15-CV-02159-VC, 2018 WL 11024841 (N.D. Cal. 2018);
Revised Order Document 271 Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approving Service
Awards, and Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 15, Jabbari, No. 15-CV-02159-VC (N.D. Cal.
June 14, 2018).
80. Id.
81. See Order Denying 591 Motion for Accounting, Amara v. CIGNA Corp, No. 3:01-cv-02361 (D.
Conn. Aug. 6, 2020), Doc. No. 606; Order Denying 607 Motion for Clarification, Amara, No. 3:01-cv02361 (D. Conn. Sep. 10, 2020), Doc. No. 609; Brief and Special Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants in No.
20-3219, Amara v. Cigna Corp., No. 20-3219 (2d. Cir. Feb. 4, 2021).
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In short, this third phase exists in some cases, and it needs to be
institutionalized and regularized through rules that organize roles for the parties,
the lawyers, and the judges. To sustain lawyers’ involvement during this third
phase entails shaping new incentives; to do so, judges are needed to oversee what
Sam Issacharoff has called the “equitable administration of justice.”82 For
example, in some aggregations, a leadership team (the Plaintiff Steering
Committee or other such appellations for these ad hoc law firms) is one part of a
larger configuration, including individually-retained plaintiffs’ attorneys filing
the cases initially (IRPAs, as Denny Curtis, Deborah Hensler, and I once called
them).83 When IRPAs are involved and if individualized work is needed,84
structured fee awards could link payments to IRPAs for client-centered work
during this third phase when lawyers need to help clients receive relief within a
settlement structure.85 As I also noted, evidence of defendants’ involvement in
implementation in such cases is scarce. Indeed, defense lawyers often become
invisible post-settlement. Yet implementation ought not be solely the province
of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Courts can fashion obligations for defendants to cooperate
and, when possible, lower transaction costs of remedies. Approval of agreements
could require joint work and post-settlement accountings from all lawyers of their
efforts to implement remedies.
IV
GENERATING ONGOING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LITIGANTS AND COURTS: A
HOMAGE TO FRANCIS MCGOVERN
Return then to fishing in the Great Lakes, the 1980s and the decades
thereafter. The 1985 Michigan consent agreement had a series of implementation
provisions, and the 2000 successor agreement had yet more. With all the
committees and structures, the parties nonetheless returned frequently to court.
Rather than bemoan those interactions, they ought to be appreciated as
exemplary of complex remedies for hard problems. Once an agreement has been
reached, the parties and the courts should expect that implementation would
generate new information and with it, that more disagreement can emerge. And,
82. Samuel Issacharoff, Rule 23 and the Triumph of Experience, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No.
2, 2021, at 161, 182.
83. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah R. Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 300 (1996); see, e.g., In re Nineteen
Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1992); In
re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 300 (1st
Cir. 1995).
84. See Order Denying Non-Class Counsel’s Motions for Attorneys’ Fees, In re Volkswagen “Clean
Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1474312, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017). Judge Charles Breyer denied “244 motions for attorneys’ fees and costs filed
by attorneys who did not serve as Class Counsel . . . [b]ecause Volkswagen did not agree to pay these
fees and costs as part of the Settlement, and because Non-Class Counsel have not offered evidence that
their services benefited the class, as opposed to their individual clients.” Id. Such lawyers could, of course,
recoup fees from individual clients with whom they had retainers. Id.
85. See Baker and Herman, supra note 37.
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whether discord emerges or not, and whatever forms remedies take, court
oversight is needed to ensure distributional fairness and to facilitate public access
to the processes and outcomes of these large-scale cases.
Francis McGovern wisely helped to shape a fifteen-year aspirational
agreement that, even within that time, proved fraught with discord. What he
brought into being was a partial peace that created a path to ongoing negotiations
and less violent interactions among the various parties. His goals ought to be our
goals: to ease the tensions and to find ways to respond to harms through legal
structures that put people into ongoing relationships in which they work together.
The many lawsuits that generate ongoing relationships among disputants under
the umbrella of consent decrees with a range of remedies are marks of Francis
McGovern’s contributions.

